Document for the Annual General Meeting to be held on May 24, 2017

Agenda and draft resolutions:

1. Submission of the adopted individual Financial Statements 2016 and Directors’ Report, the (consolidated) Corporate Governance Report, the (consolidated) Payments to Governments Report, the consolidated Financial Statements 2016 and Group Directors’ Report, the proposal of the appropriation of the profit and the Report of the Supervisory Board for the financial year 2016.

No resolution shall be taken in respect of this agenda item.


“The annual financial statements as of December 31, 2016 show a profit of EUR 408,769,341.

The Executive and the Supervisory Board recommend that the profit shown in the Financial Statements of OMV Aktiengesellschaft as of December 31, 2016, shall be appropriated/allocated as follows:

Dividend distribution of EUR 1.20 per share entitled to receive dividends and carrying forward the remaining amount to new account.”

3. Resolution on the discharge of the members of the Executive Board for the financial year 2016.

“The Executive Board and the Supervisory Board propose granting discharge to the persons having served as members of the Executive Board during the financial year 2016 with respect to this period.”

4. Resolution on the discharge of the members of the Supervisory Board for the financial year 2016.

“The Executive Board and the Supervisory Board propose granting discharge to the persons having served as members of the Supervisory Board during the financial year 2016 with respect to this period.”

5. Resolution on the remuneration for the members of the Supervisory Board for the financial year 2016.

“The Executive Board and the Supervisory Board propose setting the remuneration of the members of the Supervisory Board relating to the fiscal year 2016 as follows:

Chairman: EUR 30,000.--
Deputy Chairperson: EUR 25,000.--
Member: EUR 20,000.--

Chairman of a Committee: EUR 14,000.--
Deputy Chairperson of a Committee: EUR 12,000.--
Member of a Committee: EUR 10,000.--

Members of the Supervisory Board who are not residents of Austria shall in addition be reimbursed the withholding tax by the company.

Meeting fee: EUR 400.--“

6. **Appointment of the auditor and Group auditor for the financial year 2017.**

“The Supervisory Board proposes appointing Ernst & Young Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft m.b.H., Vienna, as auditor and group auditor for the financial year 2017.”

7. **Resolutions on (i) the Long Term Incentive Plan 2017 and (ii) the Share Part of the Annual Bonus 2017.**

“The Executive Board and the Supervisory Board recommend the approval, by separate resolutions, of the following share based and performance related incentive and compensation plans:

(i) **Approval of the Long Term Incentive Plan 2017**

**Plan type**
Performance share plan

**Plan purpose and objectives**
The performance share plan (Long Term Incentive Plan – LTIP) is a long-term compensation instrument for the Executive Board and selected senior managers that promotes mid and long-term value creation at OMV.

The plan seeks to align the interests of management and shareholders by providing management with the ability to receive company shares subject to performance against key measures linked to the medium-term strategy and shareholder return. The plan also seeks to prevent inadequate risk-taking.

**Eligibility**
Executive Board members are obliged to participate, selected senior managers of Group companies may participate in the LTIP. The nomination of senior managers is yearly done by the OMV Executive Board and is based in particular on the position and/or performance level of the respective senior managers and may also be either not granted or granted only partly.

**Personal share ownership rules**
Executive Board members and senior managers are required to build up an appropriate volume of shares in OMV Aktiengesellschaft and have to hold these shares until retirement or departure from the company. For Executive Board members, the shareholding requirement is defined as a percentage of the annual gross base salary (calculated on the basis of the January 2017 gross base salary or gross base salary for the first month as participant):

- Chairman of the Executive Board: 200%
- Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board: 175%
- Other Executive Board members: 150%

For Senior Managers, the shareholding requirement is defined as 75% of the respective grant level, which is fixed within a given range. To reflect the appropriateness of the
required shareholding, this percentage must be developed and maintained in shares until departure from the company. Executive Board members must achieve the required shareholding within 5 years after their respective initial appointment as Executive Board member.

Base for the calculation of the respective number of shares: Average share price over the three-month period January 1, 2017 – March 31, 2017 (= average of closing prices at Vienna Stock Exchange). The calculated number of shares is rounded up.

Subsequent changes in the share price do not influence the number of shares required. In case and to the extent of a salary increase of Executive Board members the number of shares has to be adapted (using the above defined share price).

Shares granted to Executive Board members under the annual bonus and vesting for Executive Board members under this LTIP and former LTIPs as well as investments made for previous LTIPs count towards this shareholding requirement, provided that they are held on an OMV trustee deposit. Private shares may be transferred to the OMV trustee deposit to be counted towards the shareholding requirement.

Dividends for the shares held on OMV trustee deposits will be paid out in cash.

Senior managers are not obliged to hold shares if the holding of the company’s shares is prohibited by law in the countries where the respective senior managers work.

Grant levels
The maximum grant is expressed as a percentage of the annual gross base salary:

- 175% for the Chairman of the Executive Board
- 150% for the Deputy Chairman of the Executive Board
- 125% for other Executive Board Members

For senior managers, the grant level is defined within a fixed range. However, the maximum grant shall not exceed 112.5% of the annual gross base salary. In case an Executive Board member is appointed later than January 1, 2017 the grant is calculated on a pro rata basis related to 2017. The same applies for an exit during 2017. The grant to Executive Board members is made by the Supervisory Board. The grant to senior managers is made by the Executive Board.

The maximum grant of the shares attributable to the participant at the Vesting Date shall be calculated as follows: The relevant amount for each participant (percentage as mentioned above) divided by OMV’s average share price (= closing price at the Vienna Stock Exchange) over the three-month period January 1, 2017 – March 31, 2017. The number of shares will be rounded down.

Before the Vesting Date the potential shares are “virtual”, i.e. the participants do not hold the shares and have no voting or dividend rights.

After the performance period the definite number of shares shall be calculated based on the achievement of the performance measures and then made available to the participants at the Vesting Date, subject to the fulfilment of the shareholding requirement.

The exact number of shares to be transferred under the LTIP 2017 can only be calculated after the performance period based on the achievement of the performance measures. Based on OMV’s average share price (= closing price at the Vienna Stock Exchange) over the three-month period January 1, 2017 – March 31, 2017 of EUR 34.99 and current annual gross base salaries the maximum number of shares potentially transferred to the members of the Executive Board amounts to 111,101 shares (gross).

In any case, the total number of shares paid out under this plan or other share incentive plans of the OMV Group shall amount to less than 5% of outstanding share capital. The actual number of shares is expected to be far below 5%.

Effective dates and term
- Plan commencement: January 1, 2017, subject to AGM approval
• Performance period: 3 years (January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019)
• Vesting date: March 31, 2020

**Performance measures and weightings**
The number of shares is calculated by multiplying the maximum grant of shares by the overall percentage of performance achievement. Performance measures focus on sustained value creation across the following areas of performance:

**Total Shareholder Return (TSR)**
60% of the total award is based on TSR (Total Shareholder Return) relative to a group of peer companies. The performance is calculated as set out below under “Calculation of relative TSR outcome”.

**Cash flow elements**

a) **Free cash flow**
10% of the award is based on the overall cash generation: free cash flow before dividends and excluding divestments and acquisitions averaged over the three-year period.

b) **Performance-element for divestment and acquisition projects**
10% of the total award is based on the performance in divestment and acquisition projects during the three-year period. The target is to successfully complete major divestment and acquisition projects, in accordance with OMV’s strategy as approved by the Supervisory Board. The most important criterion is the value maximization for the company (e.g. price vs. comparable transactions and companies). The following additional criteria also have to be applied for the evaluation:
- Adherence to planned timeframe for signing,
- Adherence to planned timeframe for closing,
- Achievement of at least current market terms and conditions,
- Performance of project compared with approved business plan (if applicable).

**Reserve Replacement Rate (RRR)**
10% of the total award is based on the 3-year average RRR (calculated on 1P reserves).

**Sustainability element**
10% of the total award is based on the 3-year average Lost-Time Injury (LTI) rate.

For both cash flow elements, RRR and the sustainability element a vesting as shown in the table below will be granted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Vesting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stretch</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below threshold</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Awards will vest on a straight line basis between these points.

The defined performance measures must not be amended during the performance period of the LTIP. However – in order to maintain the incentivizing character of the program – the Supervisory Board will have discretion to adjust the threshold/target/stretch levels (but not the measures as such) in case of significantly changed market conditions and/or other special circumstances.

The compliance with the measures and the degree of target achievement (including eventual adjustments, as described above) will always be evaluated by the Supervisory Board, considering whether the resulting awards are proportionate to the tasks and performance of the individual Executive Board member, to the situation of the company and to the usual remuneration and whether the measures of a long-term performance
incentive for sustainable development of the company is respected (Section 78 Para 1 Stock Corporation Act). This applies accordingly for the Executive Board when assessing the compliance with the measures and the degree of target achievement with regard to awards for senior managers.

**Calculation of relative TSR outcome**

Performance of the relative TSR measure is calculated by comparing the TSR of OMV over the three year performance period against the TSR of a peer group of companies. The relative TSR peer group was determined by the Supervisory Board and includes the following companies:

- Shell
- BP
- Total
- Eni
- Statoil
- Lundin Petroleum
- Repsol
- Galp Energia
- MOL
- Tupras
- Neste Oil
- PKN

TSR is the percentage change in the value of an investment in a company over a given period and is calculated as:

- the growth in share price over a given period; plus
- the value of dividends paid out over the period, assuming they are reinvested in company shares.

To reduce the effect of volatility in the share price the TSR is averaged over the period of three months before the start of the performance period (October 1, 2016 – December 31, 2016) and the three months before the end of the performance period (October 1, 2019 – December 31, 2019). In case there are corporate events either within the company or in the peer group, such as mergers and acquisitions, share splits, or the issuance of bonus shares, the TSR is calculated for each period independently prior to and after the corporate event.

The TSR of each of the companies in the peer group will be assessed over the three year performance period and ranked in order of performance with the highest TSR at the top and the lowest at the bottom (OMV is not included in this initial ranking). For the ranking the quartiles (first quartile, median and third quartile) are calculated. A vesting percentage for OMV is then calculated based on the relative position of OMV between the two quartiles immediately above and below the TSR of OMV. The vesting between the two quartiles is calculated on a straight line basis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Vesting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stretch: at or above third quartile</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≥75th percentile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target: at median</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(=50th percentile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold: at or below first quartile</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(≤25th percentile)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The shares granted have to be reduced or have to be returned in the case of a clawback event. Furthermore, if the shares or cash equivalents were based on incorrect calculations of the bonus, the Executive Board members are obligated to return or pay back benefits obtained due to such wrong figures.
Vesting/payout
To the extent the shareholding requirement is not fulfilled, the payment will be automatically made in the form of shares until the requirement is reached. Otherwise the Executive Board members and senior managers can opt for (i) single payment in shares, or (ii) single payment in cash. In addition, senior managers can opt for cash payment in instalments. Participants must make this decision by quarter three of the year the plan starts. If such a decision cannot be taken because of compliance relevant information the payment will automatically be made in cash (single payment). The delivery of shares or cash payment to the participants is generally made net after deduction of taxes (in Austria payroll tax deduction). The total number of shares (net after deduction of taxes) to be allocated at vesting will be rounded down.

If authorization for the share transfer has been given by the Supervisory Board on the Vesting Date or earlier, transfer of bonus shares will be executed on the next business day after the Vesting Date, otherwise the transfer takes place with the beginning of the next month following the authorization, in each case subject to legal restrictions, if any. The company does not cover any share price risk caused by the delay or by transfer.

If the payment is made in cash, the amount will be calculated by using the OMV’s average share price (= average of closing prices at the Vienna Stock Exchange) of the time period 14 working days (where the Vienna Stock Exchange is open) prior to the Vesting Date until the Vesting Date (if this day is not a business day, then the respective business day before).

In case any payout in cash or transfer of shares is based on incorrect data, the amounts will be corrected accordingly.

Plan management for leavers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>Entitlement before Vesting Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Bad Leavers (Section 75 Para 4 Stock Corporation Act or Section 27 Employees Act or termination by the participant without good cause)</td>
<td>Unvested awards are forfeited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Good Leavers (leaver termination other than (a) or (c) to (e))</td>
<td>Unvested plans continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Retirement, permanent disability</td>
<td>Unvested plans continue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Death</td>
<td>Unvested plans are valued and settled in cash per date of death. The value shall be calculated based on actual performance until the date of death plus budget/Mid-Term-Planning numbers for the remaining time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Change of control in the ownership structure</td>
<td>In case of early termination of the appointment as Executive Board member and/or the related employment contract declared by the Company following a “Change of Control” (that means more than 50% of the share capital of and/or of the voting rights in OMV Aktiengesellschaft having been obtained by a person or corporate body (acting alone or in coordination with others)) any award under the LTIP shall vest on the date of the Change of Control subject to the projected target achievement at that time. All other early terminations following a Change of Control in OMV result in the application of the leaver concept (see above).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The leaver regulations apply in an adapted form for Senior Managers in order to meet different requirements (e.g. for involuntary or temporary leavers).
Plan termination and clawback
The plan cannot be terminated in principle.

In a situation where a participating senior manager wants to terminate the LTIP participation, a written approval by the competent Executive Board member is necessary. As a consequence of termination all benefits and rights are lost and shareholding requirements lapse. Termination applies to all plans not yet vested.

Under circumstances as detailed below, the Supervisory Board may reduce the number of shares or the amount of cash payments for the Executive Board or may request retransfer of the shares or repayment of the cash payments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for clawback</th>
<th>Adjustment by Supervisory Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment of approved financial statements due to a mistake.</td>
<td>The LTIP amount attributable to the relevant year is reduced / forfeited in full.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material failure of risk management which leads to significant damages (like Deep Water Horizon accident, Texas City Refinery accident).</td>
<td>LTIP can be reduced / forfeited in full.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious misconduct of individual Executive Board member which violates Austrian law.</td>
<td>LTIP can be reduced / forfeited in full.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Approval of the Share Part of the Annual Bonus 2017

Plan purpose and objectives
The annual bonus consists of two integrated elements. One part of the bonus is paid out in cash, whereas the other part is allocated in shares. The magnitude of the share part of the annual bonus (previously known as “Matching Share Plan”) matches the cash element of the annual bonus. Both elements are equal and subject to the same performance measures. The share part of the annual bonus is restricted to Executive Board members and is a long-term incentive and compensation vehicle for the members of the Executive Board that promotes retention and shareholder alignment in OMV, combining the interests of management and shareholders via a long-term investment in restricted shares. The plan also seeks to prevent inadequate risk-taking. The share part of the annual bonus provides for an award of shares which are counted towards the shareholding requirements under existing and future Long Term Incentive plans.

For Executive Board members, an award of shares will be made to match 100% of their gross annual cash bonus. The maximum gross annual cash bonus can amount to 100% of the annual gross base salary and is, as the share part of the annual bonus, based on the following performance criteria:

Performance measures and weightings:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Weight</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clean CCS NOPAT (means Clean Current Cost of Supplies Net Operating Profit After Tax and denotes the operating result after taxes and before financing costs, adjusted for special items and current cost of supplies)</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free cash flow before dividends and excluding divestments and acquisitions</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reported ROACE (means Return On Average Capital Employed excluding special items related to the sale of OMV Petrol Ofisi A.S.)</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major capital projects 1: Deviance regarding costs and schedule of the most important investment projects, which are defined by the Supervisory Board at the beginning of the performance period and assessed at the end of the performance period based on a pre-defined matrix.</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Major capital projects 2:**
Assessment of a selection of investment projects, which represent the major part of running investments based on the non-market annual change of NPV (Net Present Value).

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost reduction:</strong></td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The target is a reduction of operating costs versus 2016 on a comparable basis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Sustainability multiplier:** |        |
| The multiplier has a value between 0.9 and 1.1 (this is +/- 10%) which will be determined at discretion of the OMV Supervisory Board. For this discretionary decision the OMV Supervisory Board will decide based on management self-evaluation and other factors which may include an independent assessment regarding the general progress on sustainability (e.g. based on further development of the Lost-Time Injury Rate (LTIR), a new sustainability strategy, the amount and volume of spills or other factors having an impact on the sustainability performance). The bonus will be reduced automatically by 5% in case of a work-related fatality – so there remain 5% for the discretion of the Supervisory Board for the above mentioned assessment. |

| **Financial targets and performance multiplier:** |        |
| Financial targets will be recalculated based on actual oil/gas price, fx-rate, etc. compared to assumptions in case of big changes in external influences. The adjustment is possible in both directions and will be determined by the OMV Supervisory Board. In addition, the OMV Supervisory Board will decide based on management self-evaluation and other factors which may include an independent assessment of the OMV Supervisory Board regarding the general performance, whether the overall bonus achievement shall be adjusted. |

For all performance measures except for the sustainability multiplier and the financial targets and performance multiplier, vesting as shown in the table below, will be granted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance</th>
<th>Vesting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stretch</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threshold</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Below threshold</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Awards will vest on a straight line basis between these points.

The financial element of the financial targets and performance multiplier is applied to threshold/target/stretch levels of clean CCS NOPAT, free cash flow and ROACE. The sustainability multiplier and the performance element of the financial targets and performance multiplier is applied to the actual overall bonus achievement. The shares granted have to be reduced or have to be returned in the case of a clawback event. Furthermore, if the grant was based on incorrect calculations of the bonus, the Executive Board members are obligated to return benefits obtained due to such wrong figures.

The performance measures defined for the annual bonus must not be amended during the term of the annual bonus. However, significant changes in the tax-, legal- or royalty-situation might require target adjustments. In this connection the Supervisory Board will, as for the other discretionary decisions (in particular with regard to the determination of the sustainability multiplier and the financial targets and performance multiplier according to the above stated performance measures), in any case comply with Section 78 Para 1 Stock Corporation Act.

In each case (i.e. in particular after applying the multipliers) a cap of 100% of the base salary is applicable.
Plan mechanisms
On determination of the annual bonus by the Remuneration Committee of the Supervisory Board, the share grant will be made net (after deduction of taxes) in company shares which shall be transferred to a trustee deposit, managed by the company, to be held for three years. Dividends, if any, earned from the vested shares are paid out to the Executive Board members in cash.

Grant levels
Executive Board members are awarded shares of up to 100% of their annual gross base salary.

Determining the number of shares at the point of award grant
On determination of the gross annual bonus one half of the gross annual bonus is made in company shares.

The number of shares awarded is calculated as follows:

- Gross annual cash bonus amount divided by the average closing price for OMV shares at the Vienna Stock Exchange over the three-month period November 1, 2017 – January 31, 2018.
- The resulting number of shares will be rounded down.

The exact number of shares to be transferred under the annual bonus 2017 can only be calculated after the performance period based on the achievement of the performance measures. Moreover, the maximum amount of shares to be granted under the annual bonus 2017 cannot be determined at this point of time because it depends on the average closing price for OMV shares at the Vienna Stock Exchange over the three-month period November 1, 2017 – January 31, 2018. Based on an average closing price for OMV shares at the Vienna Stock Exchange over the three-month period January 1, 2017 – March 31, 2017 of EUR 34.99 and current annual gross base salaries, the maximum number of shares to be transferred under the annual bonus 2017 would amount to 78,591 shares (gross).

In any case, the total number of shares paid out under this plan or other share incentive plans of the Group shall amount to less than 5% of outstanding share capital. The actual number of shares is expected to be far below 5%.

Effective dates & term
- Plan start: January 1, 2017 as an integral part of the annual bonus agreement subject to AGM approval
- Vesting Date: March 31, 2018, subject to Supervisory Board approval
- Holding period: 3 years from vesting

Vesting/Payout
If authorization for the share transfer has been given by the Supervisory Board on the Vesting Date or earlier, transfer of bonus shares will be executed on the next business day after the Vesting Date, otherwise the transfer takes place with the beginning of the next month following the authorization. The company does not cover any share price risk caused by the delay or by transfer.

The payment will, subject to any legal restrictions, be made in the form of restricted shares (net after tax deduction), which have to be held three years from vesting.

Rules for leavers
The rules outlined above under the draft resolution 7 (i) for the LTIP 2017 apply, whereas for good leavers and in the case of retirement and permanent disability the vesting of unvested awards remains subject to a decision to be made by the Supervisory Board in its discretion. For this discretionary decision, the Supervisory Board especially has to comply with Section 78 Para 1 Stock Corporation Act.

Plan termination and clawback
The plan cannot be terminated.
Under circumstances as detailed below, the Supervisory Board may reduce the number of shares vesting under the annual bonus or may request retransfer of the shares.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for clawback</th>
<th>Adjustment by Supervisory Board</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjustment of approved financial statements due to a mistake.</td>
<td>The share part of the annual bonus granted in relevant year is reduced / forfeited.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material failure of risk management which leads to significant damages (like Deep Water Horizon accident, Texas City Refinery accident).</td>
<td>The share part of the annual bonus can be reduced / forfeited in full.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serious misconduct of individual Executive Board member which violates Austrian law.</td>
<td>The share part of the annual bonus can be reduced / forfeited in full.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>